Introduction
One of the four major trends seen by Air University in "Air Force 2025" is that "influence increasingly will be exerted by information more than by bombs." In "Joint Vision 2010," the Joint Chiefs of Staff specify the central operational concept of the future-the one from which the others will flow-to be information superiority -John T. Correll "Warfare in the Information Age"
Air Force Magazine
According to the National Security Strategy, the security of America's people, territory, and way of life, must be protected. 1 Consequently, the United States is to remain engaged in the world and to enlarge the community of secure, free market and democratic nations. 2 The strategy's three central goals are "to enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad, to bolster America's economic revitalization, and to promote democracy abroad." 3 The National Security Strategy further states:
The emergence of the information and technology age presents new challenges to U.S. strategy even as it offers extraordinary opportunities to build a better future. This technology revolution brings our world closer together as information, money and ideas move around the globe at record speed; but it also makes possible for the violence of terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking to challenge the security of our borders and that of our citizens in new ways.
In order to achieve the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement, the National Military Strategy calls for flexible and selective engagement of US military 5 power to assure the nation's security. The three components of this strategy are "peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars." 6 The strategy states that, in war, US military forces will follow several principles, one of which is "help dominate combat operations by winning the information war." 7 Why? Because modern reconnaissance, intelligence collection and analysis, and high speed data processing and transmission greatly enhance our ability to dominate warfare. 8 As the National Military Strategy states, "We must assure that this leverage works for us and against our adversaries." Vision 2010 is "the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting." 10 The vision identifies four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. 11 One vital aspect of the vision is the acknowledgment that:
We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information warfare. 12 An illustration in Joint Vision 2010 depicts the four operational concepts flowing from information superiority and resulting in massed effects. 13 In addition to Joint Vision 2010, C4I for the Warrior continues as the enduring command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) vision of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Started in 1992, "C4I for the Warrior is a unifying concept that brings to the warrior an accurate and complete picture of the battle space, timely and detailed mission objectives, and the clearest view of the targets." 14 The 1995 progress report on this vision identified the growing importance of information warfare (IW), stating, "The use of advanced information systems and our increasing dependence on these systems leads to an increase in our vulnerability to adversary information warfare. IW is a warfare area defined by the target set of information, information based processes, and information systems. IW focuses on affecting an adversary's information environment while defending our own." 15 Additionally, the October 1996 update to the Air Force Executive Guidance identified the core competencies of the USAF, one of which is information superiority.
The document states that information superiority was the first core mission of the Air
Force. This mission was initially accomplished as "early balloons and airplanes became spotters for Army commanders who were attempting to gain information to improve their decisions on the battlefield and gain advantage over an adversary." 16 The Secretary of the Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks.
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From yet another perspective, the Army published Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, in August 1996. In contrast with the Air Force and DOD, FM 100-6 states:
The Army, recognizing that IW as currently defined by DOD is more narrowly focused on the impact of information during actual conflict, has chosen to take a somewhat broader approach to the impact of information on ground operations and adopted the term information operations. The Army adopted this broader approach to recognize that information issues permeate the full range of military operations (beyond just the traditional context of warfare) from peace through global war. IO implement the IW policy for the land component commander. Information Operations: Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.
Information Warfare: Information operations conducted during times of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.
12
The intent is to make a distinction between information operations and information warfare, with information warfare being a subset of information operations, conducted during times of crisis or conflict.
Obviously, the definition of information warfare has been in a state of flux. Joint Pub First, almost certainly there is less to information warfare than meets the eye. Although information systems are becoming more important, they are also becoming more dispersed and, if prepared, can easily become redundant.…Second, information warfare has no business being considered as a single category of operations. Of the seven types of information warfare presented here, two-information blockade and cyberwarfare-are notional and the third-hacker warfare-although a real activity, is grossly exaggerated as an element of war viewed as policy by other means.…Third, most of what U.S. forces can usefully do in information warfare will be defensive, rather than offensive. Much that is labeled information warfare is simply not doable-at least under rules of engagement the United States will likely observe for the foreseeable future. 18 The intent here is to provide a general impression about some of the current thinking on the subject. Clearly, there is a flurry of activity occurring in this area. This is the direct result of the importance with which the military, including the Air Force, views information warfare. Since it is so significant, the Air Force needs to produce guidance on 
What is Doctrine?
Although countless books and articles have been written on the subject, perhaps the best starting point to answer this question is to examine current USAF doctrine, that is, Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force. It is based on experience, our own and that of others. Doctrine is what we learned about aerospace power and its application since the dawn of powered flight.…Thus, doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment rather than a set of rules to be followed blindly. It is the starting point for solving contemporary problems. Doctrine is also a standard against which to measure our efforts.…Doctrine should be alive-growing, evolving, and maturing.…If we allow our thinking about aerospace power to stagnate, our doctrine can become dogma.
20
The glossary to AFM 1-1 states that basic doctrine "provides broad, enduring guidance which should be used when deciding how Air Force forces should be organized, trained, equipped, employed, and sustained" 21 Additionally, General Fogleman expands on these basic thoughts in his recent article on doctrine in Airpower Journal. He asserts:
Air Force doctrine should provide an integrating framework to tie together the various elements of the Air Force team, to show how these elements work together, and to provide the basis for integrating airpower with other forms of combat power in joint operations. While doctrine can be useful in intellectual debates and can provide a valid input for future programming, its primary purpose should be to guide war fighting and military operations other than war.…The ultimate goal of our doctrine should be the development of an airman's perspective on joint warfare and national security issues-not just among generals, but among all airmen in all specialties. 22 For purposes of this research paper on Air Force information warfare doctrine, what can we glean from these ideas about doctrine? Based on AFM 1-1 and General
Fogleman's recent thoughts about doctrine, here are some basic characteristics of and uses for doctrine:
1. Provides the framework for understanding how to apply military power 2. Based on experience throughout history 3. Generally speaking, the best way to do the job 4. A guide rather than a strict set of rules 5. Starting point for solving present day problems and the standard for measuring efforts 6. Should be dynamic rather than static 7. The basis for organizing, training, equipping, employing, and sustaining forces 8. Defines relationships with other elements of the Air Force 9. Basis for integration with the "joint" team 10. Guides actions throughout the entire spectrum of military operations These items can be grouped into three broad categories and applied to the issue of Air Force information warfare doctrine:
1. Fundamental concepts and ideas about information warfare 2. Relationships defined within the Air Force and for joint and multinational operations, providing the basis for organizing, training, equipping, employing, and sustaining forces 3. Guidelines, based on experience, since much of information warfare is not new, on how to conduct information warfare throughout the entire spectrum of military operations.
We should expect the official iteration of Air Force information warfare doctrine to contain these essential "ingredients."
To summarize, the question is why do we need Air Force information warfare doctrine? Despite the lack of a common definition for information warfare, it is clear that many concepts and disciplines that have existed for centuries are merging with the latest technological innovations to create a change in warfare. The best short answer to the question, why do we need Air Force information warfare doctrine, is found in the quote by
Sir Winston Churchill at the beginning of this chapter. In essence, publishing Air Force information warfare doctrine forces the USAF to more fully address the subject of information warfare and to hopefully provide solid guidance to conduct information warfare in a methodical and controlled manner, rather than potentially in a haphazard and impulsive manner. -John T. Correll, "Warfare in the Information Age"
Notes

Air Force Magazine
As stated in the introduction to this paper, the second draft of AFDD 5 provides the basis for examining the usefulness of Air Force information warfare doctrine in the next three chapters. The first area to examine is the fundamental concepts and ideas about information warfare.
The foreword to the draft AFDD 5 sets the stage for this discussion:
Information has long been an integral component of warfare. Human competition necessitates knowing one's adversary, affecting opponents' perceptions, and safe-guarding sensitive information. History is replete with examples of how important information has been in political and military struggles-from the earliest battles described in the Epic of Gilgamesh to current operations in Bosnia. Information warfare (IW)-the exploitation of an information advantage over an adversary-has raised the importance of information in successful military operations to a crucial level.
IW is not platform dependent. It is not an operation or a mission. Nor is it confined to a particular degree of hostilities on the spectrum of military operations. The fundamentals of IW-attacking an opponent's information while achieving friendly information assurance-have not changed through time. What has changed is the means of affecting the adversary's perception and will. Additionally, today's information environment presents inherent capabilities and liabilities to friendly forces heretofore unknown. It's interesting to note that information enhancement includes command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, precision navigation and positioning, public affairs, and legal considerations.
Information protection includes information security, communications security, computer security, and operations security. "Information protect activities occur within the context of four interrelated processes: information environment security, attack detection, attack response, and capability restoration." 7 Again, most of these areas are not new areas of operations. However, by merging these efforts under information warfare, information can be used to increase military capabilities and gain an advantage over an adversary.
Although AFDD 5 does provide an overarching conceptual framework for Air Force information warfare operations, it is lacking in some areas. First, the draft Air Force doctrine document needs to clarify the distinction developing in joint doctrine between information operations and information warfare. Currently, the draft document does not define information operations. In the case of the Air Force, the term information warfare connotes that although we, as a nation, may be in a state of peace, any activity conducted in the information dimension is included under the broad heading of information warfare. planning of all-source intelligence, information warfare, and security support), and more.
Obviously, the recent reorganization of the Air Staff has changed some of the specific offices. However, the point here is that an organizational chart, including a brief explanation of the organization's role and the support that can be provided to other Air
Force units would add immeasurably to the final doctrine document.
Also, the draft document fails to identify some key organizations that the Air Force must work with to conduct information warfare. First, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) ensures measures are taken to protect the Defense Information Infrastructure. DISA is also responsible for minimizing duplication of effort in this area thought the DOD. Therefore, Air Force members can interface with DISA on information protection issues. Second, the National Security Agency provides information systems security technology, products, and services to help protect against hostile information warfare. Third, the relationship between Air Force MAJCOMs is limited almost exclusively to computer security. Again, information warfare encompasses much more than this one element and the relationships in the numerous other operational areas should be identified and described.
Overall, the draft Air Force information warfare doctrine document identifies several key relationships for information warfare activities, within the Air Force and for joint and multinational operations, and briefly describes the organizational structure required to conduct information warfare. The document needs to add an organizational chart and to include some key national-level organizations that Air Force members can expect to work with during their daily information warfare operations. Finally, the published doctrine needs to further describe the relationships within and between MAJCOMs, beyond just the computer security arena currently mentioned. The second draft of AFDD 5 addresses the fundamentals and relationships necessary to conduct information warfare. With the suggested improvements, the document can be even clearer and more comprehensive. However, the document provides virtually no guidance on how to conduct information warfare. As previously stated, information warfare incorporates many activities that are not new to military operations, including such areas as psychological operations, military deception, electronic warfare, counterintelligence, command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, information security, communications security, computer security, operations security, public affairs, and legal considerations. The doctrine document defines and describes these areas but gives few guidelines and examples on how to actually conduct operations in these areas. Additionally, the document describes the information warfare coordination cell and its roles in Air Force, joint, and multinational operations. However, it must include guidance on how to use information warfare throughout the entire spectrum of military operations, from peace to general war, how to actually conduct an information warfare campaign, and how the activities relate to the overall effort of the supported commander-in-chief. One way to address the issue of information warfare campaign planning is to determine the essential elements of campaign planning and use them in whatever organizational structure is established to conduct actual information warfare operations.
Information Warfare Campaign Planning
In the 1996 Air Command and Staff College research paper, Information Warfare:
Planning the Campaign, the researchers concluded there are five essential functions required to conduct an information warfare campaign: survey, assess, command, control, and execute. 4 Survey is the function to accumulate data about the opponent's information This includes matching specific information warfare tools to centers of gravity identified in 7 the assess step. Control is the function that "analyzes received tasking orders, readies assets, responds to the threat and situational changes, and reports the results back through the chain of command." 8 Execute is the function that includes both facets of information warfare, that is, information attack and information protect. The research paper identifies six categories of operations that can be employed to attack or defend information (again, many of these operational forms are not new in the military) 9 :
Obviously, at the present time, the assets of the air, land, and sea components will be employed to execute the desired missions, but the centralized planning of the information warfare cell distributes the target information to the respective components for decentralized execution.
Another model for developing an information warfare campaign is the joint air operation planning process found in Joint Pub 3-56. By publishing Air Force information warfare doctrine, a benchmark can be established to educate Air Force members about the role of and means for conducting information warfare and also to encourage discussion for generating useful ideas and concepts on how to better conduct information warfare throughout the entire spectrum of military operations. In so doing, the Air Force can do its part to help reduce the "fog" associated with this subject. By incorporating the suggested recommendations of this research into the officially published doctrine document, then Air Force information warfare doctrine can and will be valuable to Air Force members in and for the near-term future.
In conclusion, this research paper makes the following recommendations to improve the draft Air Force information warfare document.
Fundamental concepts and ideas about information warfare:
1. Distinguish between information operations and information warfare, since the Air Force will participate in military operations other than war 2. Expand the description of the information environment that the Air Force participates in, since it is extremely reliant on the global information infrastructure and the national information infrastructure 3. Describe typical information warfare objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, since objectives drive strategies and, ultimately, execution 4. Incorporate such areas as physical security and network management, including their respective definitions and descriptions of their areas of operations, since these areas are already intertwined with other information warfare considerations
Relationships defined within the Air Force and for joint and multinational operations, providing the basis for organizing, training, equipping, employing, and sustaining forces:
1. Include a diagram to identify key Air Force information warfare organizations and their respective responsibilities (including such organizations as Air Staff, information warfare centers, information warfare squadrons, information warfare cells under the joint force commander and joint force air force component commander, and base network control centers), since Air Force members need to understand the organizational structure the Air Force uses to conduct information warfare and where they can get support, if required 2. Include some additional key organizations that the Air Force must work with to conduct information warfare, since Air Force members can expect to interact with them at various times 3. Describe the relationships within and between MAJCOMs in all areas of information warfare, since there is more to information warfare than just the computer security arena currently emphasized Guidelines, based on experience, since much of information warfare is not new, on how to conduct information warfare throughout the entire spectrum of military operations:
1. Define the essential functions required to conduct a successful information warfare campaign, regardless of the organizational structure, since Air Force members will be expected to operate in a variety of information warfare environments 2. Devise a process to develop a detailed information warfare campaign plan with the associated target list for execution, since this is the means for executing the objectives and strategies identified for any military operation 3. Integrate information warfare campaign planning into the existing deliberate and crisis action planning processes and incorporate it in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), since these are the processes Air Force members use to plan for military operations.
Notes
